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The Distributional Consequences of Supply-Side 





Using a heterogeneous agent model allowing for different degrees of complementarity 
between capital, skilled and unskilled labour, this paper evaluates supply-side reforms 
consistent with lower public debt-to-GDP in the long-run. We find that, relative to the other 
tax reforms, capital tax cuts lead to the highest aggregate welfare but are skill-biased and can 
thus increase inequality in the long-run. Depending on the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and unskilled labour, falls in the capital tax can result in welfare losses for unskilled 
workers, even in the absence of other frictions and increases in other forms of taxation. On the 
other hand, reductions in labour taxes can hurt the capitalists. We also show that including the 
transition period in the welfare evaluation lowers the inequality effects of capital tax reduc-
tions since the complementarity between capital and all labour inputs is higher in the short- 
than in the long-run. Finally, our results suggest that a form of "irrational exuberance" can 
arise after a tax cut under heterogeneous learning in the initial conditions after the reform. 
JEL-Code: E250, E620. 
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There now exists a signi￿cant and growing literature on tax reforms in dy-
namic general equilibrium (DGE) models, largely focusing on the aggregate
welfare bene￿ts and the distributional consequences of permanent reductions
in constant capital tax rates. Studies within the representative agent frame-
work suggest that tax reforms which reduce capital taxation will produce
welfare gains for the society, even if the tax burden is concurrently shifted to
labour (see e.g. Lucas, 1990, Cooley and Hansen, 1992, Angelopoulos et al.,
2011a).1 The aggregate welfare bene￿ts from tax reforms that reduce capital
taxation are also con￿rmed in models with heterogeneous agents (see e.g.
Garcia-Mila et al., 2010). However, at the same time, heterogeneous agent
models make clear that such reforms can have large redistributive e⁄ects
that will disadvantage di⁄erent groups in the society (see e.g. Domeij and
Heathcote, 2004, Greulich and Marcet, 2008 and Garcia-Mila et al., 2010).2
The literature using heterogeneous agent models has also considered dif-
ferent types of market incompleteness to demonstrate the distributional ef-
fects of tax reforms and, in particular capital tax cuts (see e.g. the papers
reviewed in Garcia-Mila et al., 2010). For the class of models that remains
closer to the neoclassical models of Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986), the cost
to workers from a capital tax cut generally arises from an increase in labour
taxes needed to maintain the level of tax revenue. In contrast, the bene￿ts
take the form of increased labour productivity delivered by the increase in
the capital stock. In addition, the inclusion of the transition period in the
welfare evaluation of the reforms is crucial. This is because the bene￿ts asso-
ciated with the above trade-o⁄materialise later in the lifetime of the worker,
whereas the costs have an immediate e⁄ect (see e.g. Greulich and Marcet,
2008 and Garcia-Mila et al., 2010).
However, there are strong reasons to believe that a reduction in capital
taxes, without further changes in other taxes, need not bene￿t all agents
if there is heterogeneity in work skills and the production structure exhibits
1At the same time, at the aggregate level, there is also an important literature that
examines optimal tax policy. The general message from Ramsey optimal taxation is that
the tax rate on capital should be zero in the long-run (see e.g. Chamley, 1986, Chari et
al., 1994 and Chari and Kehoe, 1999). This result, however, does not necessarily hold
in models incorporating market failures (see e.g. Guo and Lansing, 1999), nor in models
under time-consistent optimal taxation (see e.g. Klein et. al., 2008).
2Studies that take into account the redistributive e⁄ects of capital taxation in designing
optimal taxation in heterogeneous agent models are fewer. In Judd (1985) and Chamley
(1986), Ramsey-type optimal taxation leads to a zero tax on capital in the long-run.
However, this result does not necessarily hold when time-consistent taxation is considered
(see e.g. Krusell, 2002, and Angelopoulos et al., 2011b).
2capital-skill complementarities as suggested by e.g. Stokey (1996) and Krusell
et al. (2000). When skilled labour complements capital more than unskilled,
capital-augmenting policies will be skill-biased and will thus increase the wage
premium and inequality.3 In addition, the importance of the transition path
after a tax reform suggests that considering alternative expectation generat-
ing mechanisms is also useful. For instance, Giannitsarou (2006) has shown
that capital tax cuts, which necessitate learning on the part of the agents
towards the new equilibrium, can reduce the desirability of such reforms.
However, Giannitsarou (2006) worked in a representative agent framework
and thus did not consider the case where agents might have heterogeneous
initial conditions for learning after the reform.
With the above background in mind, this paper aims to welfare-evaluate
changes in income tax rates for di⁄erent types of agents, in a model that
allows for capital-skill complementarity and dynamics that can be in￿ uenced
by heterogeneity with respect to initial conditions for learning. To isolate
the e⁄ects of changes in each tax rate on all agents, we consider changes
in tax rates that are not revenue neutral. Instead, given its current policy
relevance, we consider tax reforms consistent with a lower steady-state debt-
to-GDP ratio.
We calibrate our model to the UK economy, with the aim of obtain-
ing a realistic assessment of the likely costs and bene￿ts of tax reforms for
the di⁄erent agents. Our modeling permits us to capture key features of
heterogeneity. Following the literature on credit constraints and income in-
equality (see e.g. Galor and Zeira, 1993, Benabou, 1996 and Aghion and
Howitt, 1998), ￿nancial intermediation costs allow our model to generate
heterogeneity in savings, which is consistent with the UK data. In addition,
we use a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) speci￿cation for the pro-
duction function, following e.g. Stokey (1996) and Krusell et al. (2000),
which assumes di⁄erent degrees of complementarity with capital for skilled
and unskilled labour. This allows our calibrated model to produce factor
input elasticities and a wage premium that are in line with empirical studies.
We relax the assumption of rational expectations so that we can also
consider an adaptive learning environment. This allows us to include an
additional source of heterogeneity, in the form of the initial beliefs of the
agents who need to learn the equilibrium laws of motion. This corresponds to
an unequal distribution of information after the reform in the economy and,
as far as we know, has not yet been considered in the tax reform literature.
By ￿rst focusing on the long-run, we are able to show that the structure
3See e.g. Hornstein et al. (2005) for a review of the literature and empirical evidence
on factor- and sector-speci￿c technologies and inequality.
3of the production and, in particular, the complementarity between labour
and capital matters crucially when evaluating the welfare bene￿ts of tax
reforms for the di⁄erent agents. Relative to the other tax reforms, capital
tax reductions lead to the highest aggregate welfare but are skill-biased and
can thus increase inequality. Similarly, reductions in labour income taxes can
also disproportionately favour either skilled or unskilled labour. We ￿nd that
for a range of empirically plausible elasticities of substitution between capital
and unskilled labour, a reduction in the capital tax, or indeed any income tax,
need not be Pareto improving. In fact, when capital and unskilled labour are
su¢ ciently substitutable, a reduction in the capital tax leads to a crowding
out of unskilled labour in the production, which clearly hurts the workers.
These results complement and strengthen the analysis in Garcia-Mila et al.
(2010), since the cost to the unskilled workers does not arise from an increase
in the labour taxes in our policy experiments. Moreover, these costs remain
in the long-run.
We next ￿nd that the inclusion of the transition period in the welfare
evaluation does not reverse the above results. However, in the case of a cap-
ital tax cut, it decreases the inequality e⁄ects of this reform. The winners
from this reform, capitalists and skilled workers, bene￿t more from the higher
capital stock as this is built up over time. In contrast, the losers, unskilled
workers, are e⁄ectively indi⁄erent. Therefore, including the initial periods
helps to close the welfare gap between the agents, because, in general equi-
librium, the complementarity between capital and all labour inputs is higher
in the short-run than in the long-run.
Finally, we show that heterogeneity in learning matters. Consistent with
the results in Giannitsarou (2006), under homogeneous initial conditions in
learning, the convergence to the new steady-state is slower and this results
in welfare costs for the agents after a capital tax cut. However, heterogene-
ity in initial conditions implies learning dynamics that result in paths for
the economic variables that exhibit overshooting relative to the rational ex-
pectations solution. In this case, the errors that the learners make in the
adjustment process amplify their reaction to the tax reform, so that there is
a form of an "irrational exuberance", which is bene￿cial to all learners. Sim-
ilarly, heterogeneous learning implies welfare gains for the other tax reforms
considered.
42 Model
In this section we construct a closed-economy DGE model comprised of a
representative capitalist and representative skilled and unskilled workers who
all consume output in the product market and supply labour in the factor
market in return for labour income. The ￿rst two income groups, subject
to intermediation costs, allocate savings to physical capital and government
bonds in return for capital income whereas unskilled workers do not save.
The representative ￿rm is owned by the capitalist who hires (skilled and
unskilled) labour services and leases physical capital from the factor market
for which it pays the competitive wage and interest rate respectively. Finally,
the government taxes economic activity, provides public spending and issues
debt to balance its budget.
2.1 Population composition
The population size, N, is exogenous and constant. Among N, Nc < N
are identical capitalists, Ns < N are identical skilled workers, and the rest,
Nu = N￿Nc￿Ns, are identical unskilled workers. Capitalists are indexed by
the subscript c = 1;2;:::;Nc, skilled workers by s = 1;2;:::;Ns and unskilled
workers by u = 1;2;:::;Nu. There are also Nf ￿rms, f = 1;2;:::;Nf. We
assume that the number of ￿rms equals the number of capitalists, Nc = Nf;
and that each capitalist owns one ￿rm. It is useful, for what follows, to de￿ne
Nc=N = nc, Ns=N = ns, Nu=N = nu = 1 ￿ nc ￿ ns and Nf=N = nf.
2.2 Firms
Each ￿rm produces a single output, Y
f
t , using physical capital, K
f
t , and two
distinct types of labour, unskilled, h
f
u;t, and skilled, h
f
t, where skilled labour
is relatively more complementary to capital than unskilled labour. The pro-
duction function is given by a constant returns to scale (CRS) technology
assumed to take a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) speci￿cation fol-























where At is exogenous stochastic productivity; 0 < ￿ < 1; is the productivity
of weighted capital and unskilled labor; 0 < ￿ < 1 is the weight attached
to capital in the composite factor; and 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1, where 1=(1 ￿ ￿) is the
5elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labor.4 The above
CES form allows us to capture the capital-skill complementarity, which is
considered to be a main driver of the skill premium and wage inequality (see
e.g. Krusell et al., 2000 and Hornstein et al., 2005).
Each ￿rm acts competitively, taking prices and policy variables as given,














subject to the technology constraint given by (1); where wt and wu;t are,
respectively, the wage rates of skilled and unskilled labour and rk
t is the
interest rate on capital.5 The di⁄erent roles in the production function for
skilled and unskilled labour imply that there will be a skill premium for the
former, in the sense that the ratio of wt to wu;t will be larger than unity.
We will calibrate the production function so that the implied factor input
elasticities and the resulting wage premium are in line with empirical studies.
2.3 Budget constraints of capitalists
The representative capitalist owns one ￿rm and receives its pro￿ts. He also
receives income from providing skilled labour services, hc;t, to the labour
market and income from interest on his accumulated stock of ￿nancial assets,
in the form of capital, Kc;t, and government bonds, Bc;t. The interest rate
on government bonds is given by rb
t. All these sources of income are taxed.
In particular, ￿nancial asset and pro￿t income are taxed at the constant rate
￿k, while labour income is taxed at the constant rate ￿h.
We assume that those agents holding assets need to pay intermediation
or transaction premia due to imperfections in capital markets. For instance,
these premia can represent the costs of gathering extra information relating to
legal issues, asset-speci￿c government regulations, intermediation fees and so
on. We follow Persson and Tabellini (1992) and Benigno (2009) and assume
a quadratic cost function such that the capitalist incurs a cost of ’k
cK2
c;t for
holding physical capital and of ’b
cB2
c;t for holding government bonds, where
’b
c;’k
c > 0 measures the size of the transaction costs. The presence of this
capital market imperfection and of the associated transaction costs help the
model to capture a feature of realism. However, their main contribution
here is that they will allow us, as we shall see below, to capture household
heterogeneity in asset holdings.
4Note that when ￿ = ￿ = 1, the production function is of the standard Cobb-Douglas
form in capital and skilled labour and when 0 < ￿ < 1 and ￿ = 1 capital and unskilled
labor are perfect substitutes.
5Note that, in equilibrium, pro￿ts, ￿
f
t , are driven to zero due to perfect competition.
6The capitalist uses his income for consumption, Cc;t, investment in capital,
Ic;t, and investment in government bonds, Dc;t. He also receives average
(per agent) transfers from the government, Gt (= Gt=N). Thus, his budget
constraint is:






















while the evolution of the stock of capital and government bonds, respectively,
are given by:
Kc;t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kc;t + Ic;t (4)
Bc;t+1 = Bc;t + Dc;t (5)
where 0 < ￿ < 1 is a depreciation rate and Kc;0;Bc;0 > 0 are given.
2.4 Budget constraints of skilled workers
The problem of the skilled worker is similar to the capitalist￿ s, except that
he pays di⁄erent transaction costs, so that the capital market imperfections
a⁄ect him to a greater extent. We assume that ￿rm ownership gives an insider
advantage in ￿nancial transactions to the capitalist (due, for instance, to past
experience, socioeconomic background, networks, etc.) and thus the size of
the transaction costs is lower for the capitalist. The idea that capital market
imperfections can explain heterogeneity has been extensively examined in the
income inequality literature (see e.g. Galor and Zeira, 1993, Benabou, 1996,
and Aghion and Howitt, 1998). Most of these models assume, for simplicity,
that the intermediation cost is either in￿nite for some agents (and thus these
agents are e⁄ectively excluded from the ￿nancial market) or zero. In this
paper, we examine the case of non-zero, ￿nite intermediation costs for both





the skilled worker and capitalist even further by assuming that the former
has lower initial holdings of capital and government bonds, i.e. Ks;0 < Kc;0,
Bs;0 < Bc;0:
Accordingly, the budget constraints and the evolution equations for cap-
ital and government bonds for the sth skilled worker are:

















Is;t = Ks;t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Ks;t (7)
Ds;t = Bs;t+1 ￿ Bs;t: (8)
72.5 Budget constraint of unskilled workers
Unskilled workers di⁄er from capitalists and skilled workers in two important
respects. First, they start with zero initial holdings of assets and capital mar-
ket imperfections result in them being excluded from the ￿nancial markets as
in the models of Benabou (1996) and Aghion and Howitt (1998).6 Second, we
assume that exclusion from capital markets does not allow them to acquire
the skills to provide skilled labour services, so that their labour e⁄ort di⁄ers,
in nature, from the labour e⁄ort of the other two types of agents. Evidence
from the UK, introduced later, suggests that skill acquisition, in the form of
University education, is indeed related to socioeconomic income group.
Thus, the budget constraint of the uth unskilled worker is:
Cu;t = (1 ￿ ￿
u)wu;thu;t + Gt (9)
where 0 ￿ ￿u < 1 is the tax rate on unskilled labour, hu;t is the labour supply
and Cu;t is the consumption.
2.6 Utility function and optimal choices of agents






subject to the relevant budget constraints given above; where E0 is the con-
ditional expectations operator.
We use the instantaneous utility function:
ui;t = (Ci;t;hj;t) =
￿
(Ci;t)




where 0 < ￿ < 1 is the consumption weight in utility and ￿ > 1 is the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
To maximise discounted lifetime utility, the representative capitalist chooses
fCc;t;hc;t;Kc;t+1;Bc;t+1g
1
t=0 subject to (3 ￿ 5), the representative skilled worker
chooses fCs;t;hs;t;Ks;t+1; Bs;t+1g1
t=0 subject to (6 ￿ 8) and the representative
unskilled worker chooses fCu;t;hu;tg
1
t=0 subject to (9).
6See e.g. Aghion et al. (1999) for a microeconomic rationalisation of credit constraints
that do not allow agents to participate in asset markets.
82.7 Government budget constraint
Following the literature on tax reforms (see e.g. Lucas, 1990, Cooley and
Hansen, 1992, Giannitsarou, 2006, Garcia-Mil￿ et al., 2010, and Angelopoulos
et al., 2011a), we do not model government spending. Instead, government
expenditure takes the form of transfers to the private agents, Gt. To ￿nance
these, it taxes income from labour and ￿nancial assets and issues government
































The market clearing conditions for the capital, bond, skilled and unskilled




























c [Kc;t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Kc;t]+ (17)
+N

























where (17) gives the aggregate resource constraint of the economy.
2.9 Decentralised competitive equilibrium
The decentralised competitive equilibrium (DCE) is de￿ned when (i) house-
holds and ￿rms optimize, taking prices and policy as given; (ii) all con-
straints are satis￿ed; and (iii) all markets clear. After the relevant sub-




exogenously set stationary AR processes for technology and ￿scal policy in-
struments which are discussed below.7 We de￿ne the relevant aggregate,
economy-wide quantities as, Xt, for Xt = fCt;It;Kt;Bt;Ytg.
7To save space we have not reported the DCE system here but it will be provided on
request.
92.10 The motion of productivity and ￿scal policy in-
struments
Following the literature, we assume that the stochastic process determining







where A0 > 0 is a constant, 0 < ￿a < 1 is the autoregressive parameter and
"t ￿ iid(0;￿2) are random shocks to productivity.
Given that we wish to analyse the welfare implications of permanent
tax regime changes, all tax rates are treated as exogenous constants, 0 ￿
￿k;￿h;￿u < 1. In the policy reforms that we will examine, the economy will
start from the steady-state and will be subjected to an exogenous, permanent
change in one or more tax instruments, holding the other policy instruments,
including G, constant at the pre-reform steady-state values. We examine
economic outcomes and welfare in the new steady and during the transition
period to the new steady-state.
3 Calibration and steady-state
In Table 1, we next calibrate the structural parameters of the model so that
its steady-state solution reported in Table 2 below re￿ ects the main empirical
characteristics of the UK economy. The calibration also provides empirical
justi￿cation for the key modelling decisions made above.
3.1 Population shares
We ￿rst wish to map out agent heterogeneity and thus distinguish the three
types of households by their di⁄ering shares in the population, ni. According
to the Family Resources Survey in 2008-2009, 28% of households do not have
any savings, 53% have savings up to £20,000 and 19% have savings above
£20,000.8 In light of this, since we assume that unskilled workers do not
have savings, we set nu equal to 30%. At the other end of the distribution,
since we model capitalists as the income group with the highest share of
savings and assets, we set nc to 20% implying that ns is 50%. Other data
providing an additional dimension by which unskilled workers di⁄er from
skilled workers and capitalists is that the former group o⁄ers a labour input
that is lacking in skills. According to the Labour Force Survey of the O¢ ce for
8The survey is sponsored by the Department for Work and Pensions (see their Table
4.9 for the information reported here).
10National Statistics9, in 2003, 28% of the working population was employed in
semi-routine and routine occupations, whereas the remaining share worked
in supervisory, technical, professional and managerial occupations, which
require an increasingly higher skilled labour input. Moreover, according to
data from the Department for Education and Skills on the participation
rates in higher education for di⁄erent income groups, the participation ratio
was about three times higher in the 1990s for the three highest, relative to
the three lowest groups.10 Thus, there appears to be adequate support for
associating skill with income group.
Table 1: Parameter Values
parameter value de￿nition
0 < ￿ < 1 0.500 productivity of composite input
0 < ￿ < 1 0.400 capital weight in composite input share
0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 0.060 depreciation rate on private capital
1
1￿￿> 0 2.000 capital to unskilled labour elasticity
’k
c;’b
c> 0 0.001 transaction costs, capitalists
’k
s;’b
s> 0 0.005 transaction costs, skilled workers
0 < ￿ < 1 0.976 rate of time preference
0 < ￿ < 1 0.347 consumption weight in utility
￿ > 1 2.000 coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
0 < nc< 1 0.200 population share of capitalists
0 < ns< 1 0.500 population share of skilled workers
0 < G=Y < 1 0.330 public spending share of output
0 < ￿h< 1 0.300 labour tax rate skilled
0 < ￿k< 1 0.442 capital tax rate
0 < ￿u< 1 0.200 labour tax rate unskilled
A0> 0 1.650 constant parameter productivity
0 < ￿a< 1 0.920 AR(1) parameter productivity
￿a> 0 0.030 std. dev. of productivity innovations
3.2 Productivity
We next turn to heterogeneity in productivity and returns to labour which
governs the choice of the relevant production parameters. Following Stokey
(1996), we set the weight of capital in the composite input share, ￿, to 0:4 and
￿ to 0:5 implying an elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled
labour, 1=(1 ￿ ￿), of 2. The latter is well within the range of estimated
9See http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Expodata/Spreadsheets/D7665.xls.
10See www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Expodata/Spreadsheets/D7308.xls.
11elasticities of substitution reported in the literature (see e.g. Stokey, 1996,
and Hornstein et al., 2005, for reviews of these studies).
The productivity of the composite input in the production function, ￿
and the constant term in the production function, A0, are chosen so that,
given the remaining parameters reported below, the model solution in the
steady-state predicts a skill premium and a ratio of capital to GDP that is
consistent with the UK data. In particular, we set ￿ = 0:5 and A0 = 1:65,
which leads to a steady-state skill premium, de￿ned as the log di⁄erence
between the wage rate for skilled and unskilled labour, of 32%. Also note
that the ratio of the wage rates for skilled and unskilled labour is 1:38. These
values are again broadly consistent with estimates for both the UK and the
USA. For the UK, Walker and Zhu (2008) estimate a college premium (in
log di⁄erences) of about 18% for males and 28% for females, while Machin
(1996) computes the ratio of wages between non-manual and manual jobs in
manufacturing that ranges between 1:3 and 1:5, from 1970 to 1990. For the
USA, Hornstein et al. (2005) report a college premium, in terms of wage
ratios, that ranges from about 1:47 in 1982 to 1:79 in 2000.
3.3 Savings
Heterogeneity in savings is controlled for, as explained in the previous section,
by the parameters that govern transaction costs in the ￿nancial markets. Fol-
lowing the models in e.g. Galor and Zeira (1993), Benabou (1996) and Aghion
and Howitt (1998), we set these costs to in￿nity for the unskilled workers,
which implies that these agents do not have any savings. As said above,
about 28% of the UK households do not save. Regarding the households
with positive savings, data from the Family Resources Survey of 2008-2009
suggest that households in the highest saving bracket have ￿ve times higher
savings than the other savers, on average. In terms of our model, this di⁄er-
ence is applied to the representative capitalist and skilled worker by setting
the transaction costs for the latter to be ￿ve times greater than the former.
For simplicity, we set this cost in capital asset markets to be the same in the
bond market. We chose the level of the transaction costs parameter, so that
in combination with an annual depreciation rate, ￿, of 6%, the total ratio
of capital to GDP in the steady-state is about 2. This also implies that the
￿nancial transaction costs as a share of GDP is about 0.5%.
3.4 E⁄ective tax rates
E⁄ective average tax rates for capital and labour income are constructed
by following the approach in Conesa et al. (2007). We use data from the
12National Accounts and the Public Sector, Taxation and Market Regulation
databases (available from OECD Statistics), to obtain the series for 1970-
2005. The average capital tax rate over the time period is ￿k = 0:442, while
the average labour income rate is 0:27. Using data from Social Trends 38,
O¢ ce for National Statistics, we are able to approximate the progressivity of
the UK income tax system at about 1:6.11 A ratio of ￿h=￿u = 1:6, together
with the requirement that the weighted average of the two tax rates equal the
e⁄ective labour income tax rate, would imply that ￿h = 0:304 and ￿u = 0:19.
However, the progressivity of income taxation probably overestimates the
progressivity of labour income taxation, which is our interest here. This is
because, in light of the data discussed, we would expect the higher income
brackets to have more capital income compared to lower income brackets. On
the other hand, the lower the progressivity ratio, the higher the implied value
of ￿u. We thus use a progressivity ratio of ￿h=￿u = 1:5 for the calibration,
which guarantees that ￿u is equal to the base income tax rate. Accordingly,
we approximate the lower tax rate, ￿u, at 20%, and the higher labour income
tax rate, ￿h, at 30%.
3.5 Parameters common to all agents
We next approximate the rate of time preference, ￿, so that 1=￿ is equal to 1
plus the ex-post real interest rate, where we use real interest rate data from
OECD Main Economic Indicators, from 1970-2005. This gives a value 0:976
for ￿. Following Kydland (1995), we set ￿, the weight given to consumption
relative to leisure in the utility function, equal to the average value of work
versus leisure time, which is obtained using data on hours worked from the
OECD Economic Outlook database, from 1970-2005.12 We also use a com-
mon value from the literature for the intertemporal elasticity of consumption,
1=￿ = 0:5 or ￿ = 2.
Given that we will evaluate policies that reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio
below, we calibrate the share of government spending in GDP, G=Y , to obtain
a B=Y ratio of 70% based on o¢ cial forecasts for 2011-2013 (see e.g. the Pre-
Budget Forecast, June 2010, O¢ ce for Budget Responsibility)13. Finally, the
AR(1) relation for the productivity process in (18) is estimated using TFP
11This is obtained by calculating the average income tax rate that applies approximately
to the lower 30% and the upper 70% of the tax payers. We then add the national insurance
contribution rate of 11% and calculate the ratio of these two e⁄ective average tax rates.
12To obtain this we divide total hours worked by total hours available for work or leisure,
following Ho and Jorgenson (2001). They assume that there are 14 hours available for work
or leisure per day with the remaining 10 hours accounted for by physiological needs.
13See http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk.
13data from the O¢ ce for National Statistics, 1970-2005. The estimated values
for ￿a and ￿a, are 0:92 and 0:03 respectively.
3.6 Steady-state
The steady-state solution of the model is given in Table 2 below in terms
of the aggregate variables. The ￿gures show that the capitalists consume in
total 19:4% of total income (or about 22% of total consumption)14, skilled
workers consume in total 45% of total income (or around 52% of total con-
sumption) and unskilled workers consume in total 22:5% of total income (or
approximately 26% of total consumption). In addition, the capitalists in
total have around 67% of total savings and own about 67% of the capital
and government bonds in the economy. As said above, the ratio of savings,
Ic=Is, and assets, Kc=Ks and Bc=Bs, of the representative capitalist to the
representative skilled worker, are equal to ￿ve. Note also that the net (after
depreciation, tax and transaction costs) interest rates on capital and bonds,
are given respectively by:
e rk = r
k(1 ￿ ￿
































and are equal in the steady-state.
It is also worth noting that the labour supply elasticities of this model are
more in line with microeconometric studies than in the standard aggregate
RBC models (see e.g. King and Rebelo, 1999). The Frisch (or ￿-constant)
labour supply elasticity (see e.g. Browning et al., 1999) is 3:06 for capitalists,
2:15 for skilled and 2:21 for unskilled workers. The value for the capitalists
suggest that, as expected, this group is the relatively least dependent on
labour income.
The skill premium, measured as the log di⁄erences in the wage rates
is about 32%. In the steady-state, capitalists work considerably less than
skilled and unskilled workers, who work more or less the same time (see the
h0s in Table 2). Also note that in the steady-state Cc = 0:309; Cs = 0:287
and Cu = 0:239. Thus in terms of welfare, U, higher consumption and
lower work e⁄ort make the capitalists better o⁄, followed by the skilled and
14This is calculated as
(N
c￿Cc)=Y
C=Y = (Nc ￿ Cc)=C. The same formula is used below for
similar quantities.
14unskilled workers respectively. The weighted average measure of aggregate
or Benthamite lifetime utility, Ua, is also reported.15
Table 2: Steady-state (pre-reform)




















Y 0.126 e rk 0.025
w 1.015 e rb 0.025
wu 0.736 Uc -71.494
hc 0.183 Us -76.953
hs 0.241 Uu -81.649
hu 0.236 Ua -77.270
4 Tax reforms
In this section, we examine ￿ve di⁄erent tax reforms that meet a debt-to-GDP
target of 60% in the steady-state. The latter provides us with a common base
for conducting the policy reforms.16 We start by changing the capital income
tax rate, ￿k, holding all other rates constant. Next we examine changes in the
labour income tax rates, ￿rst on skilled labour, ￿h, and second on unskilled
labour, ￿h; each implying that the progressivity of labour income taxation has
been altered. We then examine the case where the government changes the
e⁄ective average labour tax rate, i.e. ￿h and ￿u move proportionately, so that
the progressivity in the labour income taxation remains una⁄ected. Lastly,
we evaluate the distributional e⁄ects of varying all tax rates proportionately.
For each tax reform considered, we ￿nd the steady-state tax rate(s) re-
quired to obtain the target debt-to-GDP ratio and welfare-evaluate this tax
reform in terms of its aggregate and distributional consequences in the long-




i = c;s;u, where ui is the welfare of i calculated at the steady state using (11) and
T = 1000. Also note that Ua = ncUc + nsUs + nuUu:
16Given that we seek to evaluate the distributional e⁄ects of tax reforms and not the
optimal size of the government or government debt, we take this debt target as given.
Hence, we do not evaluate the potential welfare bene￿ts from reducing the debt-to-GDP
ratio, in the form of, for instance, lowering the cost of borrowing for the government and
reassuring ￿nancial markets that there is no risk of default.
15run.17 We also study the transition path by starting the economy at its
pre-reform steady-state, implementing the required permanent tax reform
and then simulating the response of economy until it reaches the new steady-
state. This allows us to calculate lifetime welfare under both rational and
bounded rational expectations.
4.1 La⁄er curves in tax revenue and debt
Prior to undertaking the welfare analysis, it is ￿rst useful to demonstrate the
general equilibrium e⁄ects of tax changes on factor returns and quantities by
examining the e⁄ect of tax changes on the tax revenue from all tax bases.
The relationship between the tax revenue from a particular tax base and the
associated tax rate is, in general, given by a La⁄er curve (see e.g. Schmitt-
GrohØ and Uribe, 1997). In our model, changing a tax rate can lead to
either increases or decreases in the tax revenue collected from this tax base,
depending on whether the economy is on the upward or downward slopping
part of the curve, respectively. In the CES production function with capital-
skill complementarity that we employ, a tax rate change will have spillover
e⁄ects to the tax revenue collected from the other tax bases. For instance, an
increase in the capital tax rate will decrease the capital supply, but will tend
to increase or decrease the supply of unskilled labour, depending on whether
the latter substitutes for or complements capital in production. Thus, the
tax revenue collected from the tax base of unskilled labour income can either
rise or fall after an increase in the capital tax.
As an illustration, we plot the La⁄er curves associated with changes in ￿k
in Figure 1. The B=Y curve (lower-right panel) indicates that the target for
the debt to GDP ratio can be obtained by either increasing or decreasing ￿k
to 47:4% or 28:4%, respectively. The relationship between tax revenue from
assets and the capital tax rate (upper-right panel) shows that the economy
is near the peak of this La⁄er curve. Increasing ￿k only marginally increases
the tax revenue collected from capital, while drops in ￿k decrease tax revenue
from this source. However, the upper-left and upper-middle panels in the
Figure suggest that decreases in ￿k crowd-in both skilled and unskilled labour
and thus tax revenue from these sources increases. Thus the UK economy
appears to be on the wrong side of the total tax revenue and debt La⁄er
17Note that a lower level of debt in the steady-state implies that there will also be a
reduction in interest payments on debt and thus in total government spending, assuming,
as we do here, that the remaining components of government spending do not change.
Hence, tax reforms consistent with a lower level of steady-state debt will need to generate
a lower level of total tax revenue.
16curves with respect to ￿k.18
[Figure 1 about here]
The results for the La⁄er curves associated with the remaining tax instru-
ments are, in general, similar.19 They also imply that, consistent with the
analysis in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (1997), for a given level of debt, when a
tax rate is the variable that is chosen to satisfy the government budget con-
straint, there can be two long-run solutions.20 To rank order these equilibria
at both the aggregate level and for each type of agent, across di⁄erent tax
reforms, we next undertake a welfare analysis.
4.2 Evaluation of tax reforms in the long-run
In Table 3 we summarise the tax changes required to obtain steady-state
equilibria that are consistent with the target B=Y ratio of 60%. Given the
La⁄er curves in tax revenue and debt discussed above, this target is consistent
with both increases and decreases in tax rates.
Table 3: Tax reforms and steady-state equilibria (B/Y=0.6)
fall in tax rates rise in tax rates
￿k ￿h ￿u ￿k ￿h ￿u




￿u;￿h 0.291 0.194 0.685 0.456
￿u;￿h;￿k 0.424 0.288 0.192 0.578 0.393 0.262
We next calculate the welfare for each agent at the steady-state of these
equilibria and present, in Table 4, the welfare gains/losses relative to the
pre-reform economy. To calculate these welfare changes, we follow Lucas
(1990) and compute the percentage extra consumption that an individual
would require so as to be equally well o⁄ between the two regimes. This is
18This is consistent with data on e⁄ective capital tax rates, which suggest that cap-
ital taxation in the UK is much higher than the rest of Europe and the USA (see e.g.
Angelopoulos et al., 2011a, for a discussion of these data).
19These are not presented to save space but will be made available on request.
20A critical condition for this is that a La⁄er curve exists with respect to total tax
revenue. Further note that Schmitt-GrohØ, and Uribe (1997), also discuss the parameter
range under which some of these equilibria can be indeterminate. For our model and the













for each agent i = c;s;u, where ss denotes welfare calculated in the steady-
state.
The ￿rst observation regarding the results in Table 4 is that, as expected,
welfare is always reduced for all agents for increases in tax rates. Therefore,
we do not consider these equilibria further in the analysis which follows.
Table 4: Steady-state welfare gains/losses relative to pre-reform economy
￿
0s for fall in tax rates ￿
0s for rise in tax rates
Capitalist Skilled Unskilled Capitalist Skilled Unskilled
￿k 0.199 0.126 0.004 -0.047 -0.028 -3.7e-04
￿h -9.7e-05 0.007 0.003 -0.301 -0.302 -0.112
￿u -0.007 -8.9e-04 0.018 -0.095 -0.094 -0.297
￿u;￿h -0.002 0.006 0.006 -0.318 -0.314 -0.217
￿u;￿h;￿k 0.023 0.023 0.008 -0.223 -0.175 -0.059
Regarding the fall in tax rates, note that a proportional reduction in all
tax rates in the ￿nal row improves welfare for all agents. However, there are
di⁄erent e⁄ects on the agents from dropping one tax rate at the time. For
instance, a reduction in ￿k appears to be Pareto improving in the long-run.21
In contrast, reductions in ￿u or ￿u and ￿h combined hurt the capitalists and
are thus not Pareto improving. In addition, bene￿ts from a reduction in ￿k
are far bigger for the capitalists and skilled workers, compared to unskilled
workers. The key to interpreting these results lies in the structure of produc-
tion. As discussed above when analysing Figure 1, a fall in ￿k increases the
capital stock and this raises the productivity of both types of labour, so that
labour supply and labour income are increased. Therefore, workers also gain
by a reduction in the capital tax. This positive productivity spillover e⁄ect
is also at the heart of the zero long-run optimal capital tax results in models
that assume a relatively high complementarity between the labour input of
the worker and capital stock (e.g., as in models using Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction functions). However, consistent with Krusell et al. (2000), a higher
capital stock bene￿ts skilled labour more than unskilled, so that the wage
premium increases to 47% (implying a wage ratio of 1.59) after the reform. In
contrast, reductions in ￿u or ￿u and ￿h result in increases in unskilled labour,
21The fall in ￿h is also e⁄ectively Pareto improving since ￿ for the capitalists is essentially
zero.
18which increases skilled labour but crowds out capital, leading to lower capital
income.22
The general message from the above analysis is that the complementarity
and/or substitutability between factor inputs is important when assessing the
e⁄ects of tax reforms. This ￿nding is consistent with related research which
has emphasised the importance of di⁄erent patterns of production and sector-
and factor-speci￿c technical change on inequality (see e.g. Hornstein et al.,
2005, for a review). Here, the tax reform plays a similar role to factor-speci￿c
technological progress given the way it a⁄ects factor returns and productivity.
By reducing ￿k or ￿h the government is e⁄ectively introducing a skill-biased
change, while reductions in ￿u favor the unskilled.
4.2.1 Structure of production
To further explore the role of the production structure and, in particular,
of the elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labour, we
re-calibrate the model and repeat the above analysis for a range of these
elasticities. We consider values of ￿ between 0:5 and 0:6, as beyond 0:6, the
model solution implies wage premia that are not consistent with the data (e.g.
at ￿ = 0:7, the skill premium is about 74%). In each case, we re-calibrate
government spending so as to have a pre-reform economy with debt-to-GDP
ratio of 70%, but otherwise leave the calibration in Table 1 unchanged.
We focus on the tax reforms that involve, ceteris paribus, reductions in
the capital tax given its prominence in the tax reform and policy litera-
tures.23 The results for the welfare gains/losses for all agents are shown on
Figure 2 and suggest that reductions in the capital tax are not always Pareto
improving.
[Figure 2 about here]
For plausible values of ￿ (i.e. above 0:525) and of the elasticity of sub-
22Note that by reducing interest payments in the steady state, the tax cuts considered
here imply an additional channel through which they a⁄ect the agents di⁄erently. Namely,
debt in the steady-state represents assets to skilled workers and capitalists. Hence, its
reduction implies, ceteris paribus, a reduction in an income source for these two agents,
but not for unskilled workers. This hurts capitalists and skilled workers, especially when
the tax rate on unskilled labour falls.
23Not that, for higher values of ￿, reducing ￿h increases welfare for all agents. Skilled
labour complements both capital and unskilled labour and thus tends to increase both. As
the elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labour increases, capital can
be used more easily to complement skilled labour and this bene￿ts the capitalists, while
still allowing the unskilled workers to bene￿t from the complementarity between skilled
and unskilled labour. For the symmetrically opposite reasons, the cost to the capitalist
increases for lower values of ￿.
19stitution between capital and unskilled labour, 1=(1 ￿ ￿); (i.e. above 2:11),
workers lose from a reduction in the capital tax. The reason is that, as capi-
tal and unskilled labour become better substitutes, the latter is replaced by
capital in the production process when the returns to capital increase. The
idea that reductions in capital taxation imply welfare losses for a share of the
population that does not hold capital has also been discussed in the literature
on tax reform (see e.g. Garcia-Mila et al., 2010, and Greulich and Marcet,
2008). However the factors generating this ￿nding are di⁄erent from those
at play in our model. In particular, these studies examine revenue neutral
tax reforms whereby labour taxes are increased to compensate for the loss in
tax revenue associated with the fall in capital taxes.
4.3 Evaluation of tax reforms over the lifetime
We next evaluate the aggregate and distributional e⁄ects of the above tax
reforms over the lifetime of the agents, including the transition period, paying
particular attention to how agents form expectations after the reform. First,
we evaluate the lifetime welfare of all agents,24 as they converge to the post-
reform steady-state starting from the current economy, assuming rational
expectations (RE). In this case, the agents adjust their choices to the new
tax rates immediately when the reform takes place.
Second, we evaluate lifetime welfare assuming an adaptive learning (AL)
environment in which the agents have fully learned the pre-reform rational
expectations solution but now must learn the coe¢ cients of their reduced
form policy functions associated with the post-reform economy by using a
recursive least squares (RLS) learning algorithm, which is widely used in the
AL literature. Here, we examine two scenarios which determine the initial
conditions for learning. In the ￿rst, which serves to contextualise our results
relative to the literature, we follow e.g. Giannitsarou (2006) and Evans et
al. (2009) and assume that the agents start learning using the reduced form
coe¢ cients that correspond to the pre-reform economy. In the second, we
assume that there is heterogeneity in the initial conditions used for learning,
capturing, for instance, unequal information regarding the tax reform, so that
a subset of the population - i.e. the capitalists - can make a better initial
guess regarding the coe¢ cients in its policy function.25
It is worth noting that in the ￿rst scenario of AL with homogeneous initial
beliefs, the welfare e⁄ects of all tax reforms for all agents are e⁄ectively the
24We calculate conditional welfare or discounted lifetime utility using equation (10) and
a time horizon of 1000 periods.
25See the Appendix for the model solution under rational expectations and learning and
for details on how the initial conditions for learning are set.
20same as under the RE solution, consistent with the results in Giannitsarou
(2006).26 Hence, to save space, we do not discuss results from this solution
further and only present results from rational expectations (￿re) and AL with
heterogeneous initial beliefs (￿al) henceforth heterogenous learning.
The results for the lifetime welfare gains/losses for each agent under ra-
tional expectations and heterogenous learning are shown in Tables 5 and 6
for each tax reform considered. To quantify the importance of the latter for
welfare, we also calculate the cost of the heterogeneous learning, in terms of
the consumption supplement, compared to the RE solution. This is de￿ned
as ￿ in Tables 5 and 6.
Table 5: Lifetime welfare (lower tax rates)
￿k =0.284 ￿h =0.289 ￿u =0.173
￿re ￿al ￿ ￿re ￿al ￿ ￿re ￿al ￿
c 0.078 0.088 -0.009 -0.002 -0.002 -1.1e-04 -0.008 -0.008 -4.9e-05
s 0.071 0.087 -0.014 0.006 0.006 -7.8e-05 -0.002 -0.001 -3.6e-05
u 0.008 0.011 -0.003 0.003 0.003 -6.3e-06 0.018 0.018 -2.9e-06
a 0.052 0.062 -0.001 0.004 0.004 -6.0e-05 0.003 0.003 -2.8e-05
Table 6: Lifetime welfare (combined lower tax rates)
￿u=0.194, ￿h=0.291 ￿u =0.192; ￿h =0.288;
￿k =0.424
i ￿re ￿al ￿ ￿re ￿al ￿
c -0.004 -0.003 -9.4e-05 0.008 0.008 -6.2e-04
s 0.005 0.005 -6.9e-05 0.016 0.016 -4.7e-04
u 0.006 0.006 -5.6e-06 0.009 0.009 -4.3e-05
a 0.004 0.004 -5.4e-05 0.012 0.012 -3.6e-04
4.3.1 Rational expectations
We ￿rst compare lifetime welfare gains/costs in Tables 5 and 6 to the corre-
sponding steady-state values in Table 4 under RE. Generally, tax cuts result
in smaller (bigger) welfare gains (losses) when calculated over the lifetime
relative to the long-run for capitalists and skilled workers. In contrast, the
welfare ￿gures are roughly the same over both time horizons for the unskilled
26Note it is only when the tax reform was accompanied by a negative shock to TFP that
the rational expectations and learning transition paths di⁄ered more substantially in Gi-
annitsarou (2006). The results reported below correspond to a non-stochastic case, when
there is a zero initial shock to the model at the time of the reform. A ￿stochastic￿tran-
sition from the old to the new steady state (obtained by averaging over 2500 simulations)
produced transition paths that are very similar to those reported below.
21workers.27 Consistent with the literature, the results also indicate that the
larger bene￿ts in terms of aggregate welfare are obtained by capital tax cuts.
Hence, we focus again on the capital tax reduction as an illustration of the
importance of the transition path and heterogeneous learning for the welfare
evaluation of tax reforms. To this end, we plot in Figure 3 the pre-reform
steady-state in percent deviations from the post-reform steady-state and the
transition paths of output, inputs (capital and hours) and consumption by
agent, under RE and heterogeneous learning. The paths of consumption
and hours are important as these will ultimately determine welfare for each
agent.28
[Figure 3 about here]
The fall in capital taxes implies an increase in the capital stock and
the economy gradually converges to the new equilibrium. All labour inputs
initially increase above the new steady-state and then converge to it. As
the owners of the capital stock become wealthier, given the lower capital
tax, they tend to supply less labour, ceteris paribus. At the same time,
the higher return to capital also increases the return to labour, given the
complementarities in the production function discussed above, so that all
agents tend to increase labour supply, ceteris paribus. Of course, higher
returns to labour also have an implicit income e⁄ect, that tends to reduce,
ceteris paribus, labour supply.
In general equilibrium, the substitution e⁄ect in labour supply is at ￿rst
very strong, which results in the initial increase in labour hours. However, as
capital is built up, the income e⁄ect dominates and labour supply falls. In
the new steady-state, the above trade-o⁄s imply that the capitalists supply
less labour compared with the pre-reform equilibrium. In contrast, skilled
and unskilled workers supply more hours, as the income e⁄ect for the latter
two groups is smaller, given their smaller capital holdings. Note also that,
as we saw previously, unskilled labour is substituted by capital in the new
steady-state, provided that the elasticity of substitution between these two
inputs is high enough. In this case, after the initial sharp increase, the labour
e⁄ort of unskilled workers falls towards the new steady-state. Overall, the
dynamic analysis indicates that, in general equilibrium, the complementarity
27Note that for the tax reforms considered in Garcia-Milla et al. (2010) and Greulich
and Marcet (2008), the welfare losses to the workers from a capital tax cut are higher in
the transition period to the new steady state. This is because the cost, in the form of
a higher labour income tax, has an immediate e⁄ect after the reform, while the bene￿ts,
in the form of increased productivity, are stronger in the long run, as the capital stock is
built up.
28To save space we do not present the Figures associated with the remaining tax reforms
reported in Tables 5 and 6 but these are available on request.
22between capital and all labour inputs is higher in the short-run, compared
with the long-run. Naturally, since all inputs increase after the tax cut, so
does output.
For the capitalist and the skilled worker, consumption is at its highest
in the new steady-state, while leisure is also higher compared with most of
the transition. Note, in fact, that the initial periods after the reform are
followed by a reduction in consumption for capitalists and skilled workers, as
they shift their resources over time through capital investment, to exploit the
higher returns to capital. The simultaneous fall in consumption and leisure
time implies, in fact, that capitalists and skilled workers are worse-o⁄ in the
￿rst periods after the capital tax cut. Therefore, including the transition
path in the welfare analysis reduces the welfare gains of the tax reform for
these agents.
For the unskilled worker, consumption is at its highest immediately af-
ter the reform, which explains why including the transition in the welfare
evaluation does not decrease welfare for this type of agent. The reason is
that the only consumption e⁄ect for the unskilled worker takes place via
the increase in labour income, which is higher immediately after the tran-
sition for all agents, given the increase in labour supply at this stage. In
the long-run, labour income converges to a lower level, compared with the
￿rst periods after the reform. However, the capitalist and skilled worker also
bene￿t from the higher capital income, as the capital stock reaches the new
desired post-reform level. Obviously, the unskilled worker does not bene￿t
from the higher capital stock.
4.3.2 Heterogeneous learning
Finally, we evaluate the importance of learning under heterogeneous initial
beliefs. In particular, the skilled workers initiate their learning by using the
coe¢ cients that correspond to RE solution consistent with the old, pre-reform
steady state. In contrast, capitalists are able to guess, immediately after the
reform, the coe¢ cients that correspond to the RE solution consistent with
the new steady state.29 However, both agents￿expectations will be erroneous,
because the actual economy, as determined by the interaction of their choices,
is neither in the pre- nor in the post-reform RE equilibrium. In Figure 3, it
can be seen that as the agents revise their errors along the transition path,
the general equilibrium response to the tax reform includes an overshooting
29Note that, as in the RE solution of the model for our calibration, all the policy
experiments under the described setup yield stationary and locally E-stable solutions. In
other words, these reforms are e⁄ectively learnable (see, e.g. Evans and Honkapohja, 2001,
and Honkapohja and Mitra, 2006).
23relative to the rational expectations case. This is di⁄erent from the case
of homogeneous learning, where adaptive learning generally implies a slower
convergence to the new equilibrium (see e.g. Giannitsarou, 2006). Therefore,
contrary to homogeneous learning, which dampens the reaction to the tax
reform, the errors that heterogeneous learners make amplify their reaction.
The intuition for this result is consistent with Giannitsarou￿ s (2006) ob-
servation that positive shocks that coincide with the reform generate a "boost
in optimism" that accelerates convergence to the new steady state and capital
and output can overshoot in the early periods under learning as compared to
RE. In our case, the overshooting is obtained in the absence of such shocks.
Both capitalists and skilled workers are learners but given our assumptions
regarding heterogeneity in initial beliefs, the former already know their own
post-reform RE coe¢ cients. Hence they realise that returns on investment
are higher in the new steady state, so they start immediately investing more
and accumulating capital faster. In contrast, the skilled workers are still us-
ing the pre-reform coe¢ cients and have no information about the e⁄ects of
the new regime. Hence, the increased activity they perceive due to the deci-
sion of the capitalists appears to them as very high forecast errors, as they
keep discovering that total capital is higher than the their latest forecast.
These, in e⁄ect, act as successive positive shocks which lead them to a faster
accumulation of capital than if they were fully rational.
This overshooting from skilled workers implies that capitalists have also
made a forecast error, as actual capital is in fact higher than their forecasted
capital that would be consistent with the RE path. Hence, they also ￿cor-
rect￿their behaviour accordingly by investing more, and thus by overshooting
themselves. Thus, heterogeneity in initial conditions appears to create fore-
cast errors that e⁄ectively act as positive shocks in the early periods, as the
actual capital stock is higher than what was expected. This e⁄ect is higher
for the skilled workers, as can be seen in Figure 3.
Therefore, heterogeneous learning leads to a form of "irrational exuber-
ance" which disappears in the long-run as beliefs gradually converge to the
RE solution. However, in the particular case of a capital tax cut, this helps
to increase the welfare for all agents along the transition path, relative to
the case of rational expectations (see, e.g. the relevant ￿ ￿gures in Table 5).
The di⁄erence between rational expectations and heterogeneous learning is
very small for the remaining tax reforms, given that the change in tax rates
is also small. Naturally, for bigger tax reforms, the quantitative e⁄ects of
heterogeneous initial beliefs in learning are bigger.
245 Conclusions
Using a heterogeneous agent model allowing for di⁄erent degrees of com-
plementarity between capital, skilled and unskilled labour, we have evalu-
ated supply-side reforms consistent with lower public debt-to-GDP in the
long-run. To implement these reforms, we calibrated the model so that the
steady-state represented the current UK economy and then simulated per-
manent changes in tax rates, starting from the pre-reform steady-state. We
calculated welfare for each agent in the new steady-state and over the tran-
sition period to the post-reform steady-state.
Our results suggest that, relative to the other tax reforms, capital tax
reductions lead to the highest aggregate welfare but are skill-biased and can
thus increase inequality in the long-run. Depending on the elasticity of sub-
stitution between capital and unskilled labour, falls in the capital tax can
result in welfare losses for unskilled workers, even in the absence of other
frictions and increases in other forms of taxation. On the other hand, reduc-
tions in labour taxes can hurt the capitalists. Thus, tax reforms should be
accompanied by a careful evaluation of the production structure to identify
the groups that are mostly likely to see their returns reduced so that appro-
priate redistributive policies can be considered. Our ￿ndings also show that
including the transition period in the welfare evaluation lowers the inequality
e⁄ects of capital tax reductions since the complementarity between capital
and all labour inputs is higher in the short- than in the long-run. Finally, our
results suggest that a form of "irrational exuberance" can arise after a tax
cut under heterogeneous learning in the initial conditions after the reform.
While we have not considered redistributive policies, we expect them to
be more e⁄ective if they aim to raise the productivity of factor inputs, rather
than simply redistribute income towards the income groups that are not
favoured by the reform. A careful evaluation of such policies would be an ob-
vious extension to this work. Our analysis also suggests that useful insights
regarding the design of optimal tax-spending policies might be obtained un-
der production structures that allow for di⁄erent complementarities between
factor inputs. We leave these issues for future research.
25References
[1] Aghion, P. and Howitt, P. (1998). Endogenous Growth Theory, Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
[2] Aghion, P., Banerjee, A. and Piketty, T. (1999). ￿ Dualism and macro-
economic volatility￿ , The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 114, pp.
1359-1397.
[3] Angelopoulos, K., Malley, J. and Philippopoulos, A. (2011a). ￿ Tax struc-
ture, growth and welfare in the UK￿ , Oxford Economic Papers, forth-
coming.
[4] Angelopoulos, K., Malley, J. and Philippopoulos, A. (2011b). ￿ Time-
consistent ￿scal policy under heterogeneity: Con￿ icting or common in-
terests?￿ , CESifo Working Paper Series: 3444.
[5] BØnabou, R. (1996). ￿ Inequality and growth￿ , in B. Bernanke and J.
Rotemberg (eds.), NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1996, pp. 11-92,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[6] Benigno, P. (2009). ￿ Price stability with imperfect ￿nancial integration￿ ,
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, vol. 41, pp. 121-149.
[7] Browning, M., Hansen, L. and Heckman, J. (1999). ￿ Micro data and gen-
eral equilibrium models￿ , in J. Taylor and M. Woodford (eds.), Handbook
of Macroeconomics, vol. 1, pp. 543-633, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
[8] Carceles-Poveda, E. and Giannitsarou, C. (2007). ￿ Adaptive learning
in practice￿ , Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 31, pp.
2659-2697.
[9] Carceles-Poveda, E. and Giannitsarou, C. (2008). ￿ Asset pricing with
adaptive learning￿ , Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 11, pp. 629-651.
[10] Chamley, C. (1986). ￿ Optimal taxation of capital income in general equi-
librium with in￿nite lives￿ , Econometrica, vol. 54, pp. 607-22.
[11] Chari, V., Lawrence, C. and Kehoe, P. (1994). ￿ Optimal ￿scal policy
in a business cycle model￿ , Journal of Political Economy, vol. 102, pp.
617-52.
[12] Chari, V. and Kehoe, P. (1999). ￿ Optimal ￿scal and monetary policy￿ ,
in J. Taylor and M. Woodford (eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol.
1, pp. 1671-1745, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
26[13] Conesa J., Kehoe, T. and Ruhl, K. (2007). ￿ Modeling great depressions:
the depression in Finland in the 1990s￿ , Quarterly Review, Federal Re-
serve Bank of Minneapolis, Nov., pp. 16-44.
[14] Conesa, J., Kitao, S. and Krueger, D. (2009). ￿ Taxing capital? Not a
bad idea after all!￿ , American Economic Review, vol. 99, pp. 25-48.
[15] Cooley, T. and Hansen, G. (1992). ￿ Tax distortions in a neoclassical
monetary economy￿ , Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 58, pp. 290-316.
[16] Domeij, D. and Heathcote, J. (2004). ￿ On the distributional e⁄ects of
reducing capital taxes￿ , International Economic Review, vol. 45, pp. 523-
554.
[17] Evans, G. and Honkapohja, S. (2001). Learning and Expectations in
Macroeconomics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[18] Evans, G., Honkapohja, S. and Mitra, K. (2009). ￿ Anticipated ￿scal
policy and adaptive learning￿ , Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 56,
pp. 930-953.
[19] Galor, O. and Zeira, J. (1993). ￿ Income distribution and macroeco-
nomics￿ , Review of Economic Studies, vol. 60, pp. 35-52.
[20] Garcia-Mil￿, T., Marcet, A. and Ventura, E. (2010). ￿ Supply side inter-
ventions and redistribution￿ , Economic Journal, vol. 120, pp. 105-130.
[21] Giannitsarou, C. (2006). ￿ Supply-side reforms and learning dynamics￿ ,
Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 53, pp. 291-309.
[22] Greulich, K. and Marcet, A. (2008). ￿ Pareto-improving optimal capi-
tal and labor taxes￿ , Unitat de Fonaments de l￿ An￿lisi Econ￿mica and
Institut d￿ An￿lisi Econ￿mica Working Papers, No. 733.08.
[23] Guo, J. and Lansing, K. (1999). ￿ Optimal taxation of capital income
with imperfectly competitive product markets￿ , Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, vol. 23, pp. 967-995.
[24] Ho, M. and Jorgenson, D. (2001). ￿ Educational policies to stimulate
growth￿ , in G. Harrison, S. Jensen, L. Pedersen and T. Rutherford (eds.),
Using Dynamic General Equilibrium Models for Policy Analysis. Ams-
terdam: North Holland.
27[25] Honkapohja, S. and Mitra, K. (2006). ￿ Learning stability in economies
with heterogeneous agents￿ , Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 9, pp.
284-309.
[26] Hornstein, A., Krusell, P. and Violante, G. (2005). ￿ The e⁄ects of tech-
nical change on labor market inequalities￿ , in P. Aghion and S. Durlauf
(eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth, vol. 1, pp. 1275-1370. Amster-
dam: Elsevier.
[27] Judd, K. (1985). ￿ Redistributive taxation in a simple perfect foresight
model￿ , Journal of Public Economics, vol. 28, pp. 59-83.
[28] King, R. and Rebelo, S. (1999). ￿ Resuscitating real business cycles￿ , in
J. Taylor and M. Woodford (eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol. 1,
pp. 927-1007, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
[29] Klein, P. (2000). ￿ Using the generalized Schur form to solve a multivari-
ate linear rational expectations model￿ , Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, vol. 24, pp. 1405-1423.
[30] Klein, P., Krusell, P. and R￿os-Rull, J. (2008). ￿ Time-consistent public
policy￿ , Review of Economic Studies, vol. 75, pp. 789-808.
[31] Krusell, P., Ohanian, L., R￿os-Rull J. and Violante, G. (2000). ￿ Capital￿
skill complementarity and inequality: a macroeconomic analysis￿ ,
Econometrica, vol. 68, pp. 1029￿ 1053.
[32] Krusell, P. (2002). ￿ Time-consistent redistribution￿ , European Economic
Review, vol. 46, pp. 755-769.
[33] Kydland F. (1995). ￿ Business cycles and aggregate labor market ￿ uctu-
ations￿ , in T. Cooley (ed.), Frontiers of Business Cycle Research, pp.
126-156, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[34] Lansing, K. (1999). ￿ Optimal redistributive capital taxation in a neoclas-
sical growth model￿ , Journal of Public Economics, vol. 73, pp. 423-453.
[35] Lucas, R. (1990). ￿ Supply-side economics: an analytical review￿ , Oxford
Economic Papers, vol. 42, pp. 293-316.
[36] Machin, S. (1996). ￿ Wage inequality in the UK￿ , Oxford Review of Eco-
nomic Policy, vol. 12, pp. 47-64.
28[37] Persson, T. and Tabellini, G. (1992). ￿ The politics of 1992: ￿scal policy
and European integration￿ , Review of Economic Studies, vol. 59, pp.
689-701.
[38] Schmitt-GrohØ, S. and Uribe, M. (1997). ￿ Balanced-budget rules, distor-
tionary taxes, and aggregate instability￿ , Journal of Political Economy,
vol. 105, pp. 976-1000.
[39] Stokey, N. (1996). ￿ Free trade, factor returns, and factor accumulation￿ ,
Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 1, pp. 421-447.
[40] Walker, I. and Zhu, Y. (2008). ￿ The college wage premium and the ex-
pansion of higher education in the UK￿ , Scandinavian Journal of Eco-
nomics, vol. 110, pp. 695-709.
6 Appendix: Model Solution
To solve the model, we start by taking the ￿rst-order Taylor series ex-
pansion of the DCE and exogenous process for productivity around their
respective steady-states. For any variable Xt, these values are denoted
b Xt = logXt￿logX. We next re-express the model in matrix form as second-
order di⁄erence equation system:
xt= M1Etxt+1 + M2xt￿1 + M3zt
yt= N1xt + N2xt￿1 + N3zt + N4Etxt+1




^ Bc;t+1; ^ Kc;t+1; ^ Bs;t+1; ^ Ks;t+1
i0
contains the endogenous state vari-
ables; yt =
h
^ Cc;t; ^ Cs;t; ^ Cu;t;^ hc;t;^ hs;t;^ hu;t; ^ rb
t; ^ rk
t; ^ wt; ^ wu;t
i0
the endogenous con-
trol variables; and zt = [^ at+1] the exogenous state variables.30 The various M
and N matrices contain convolutions of the structural parameters calibrated
in Table 1. Finally, since we only have one exogenous state variable, ￿ = ￿a
and ut = "t+1.
In what follows we use (22) to brie￿ y describe how we obtain both the
rational expectations (RE) and adaptive learning (AL) solutions of the log-
linearised model.
30Other papers in the literature using this particular reduced form are e.g. Giannitsarou
(2006) and Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007; 2008).
296.1 Rational expectations
Employing the undetermined coe¢ cients method, agents ￿rst guess that the
equilibrium laws of motion for the state variables under RE have the following
linear form:
xt = ￿xxt￿1 + ￿zzt (23)
where ￿x and ￿z are coe¢ cient matrices. Substituting for zt using the last
equation in (22) gives:
xt = ￿xxt￿1 + ￿zzt￿1 + ￿z￿
￿1ut (24)
where ￿x = ￿x and ￿z = ￿z￿. Leading (24) by one-period and taking
expectations of both sides yields:
Etxt+1 = ￿xxt + ￿z￿zt (25)
















Comparing (26) with (24) implies that the unique RE solution of the reduced-
form model is given by the two parameter matrices, hereafter denoted by ￿ ￿x
and ￿ ￿z, that satisfy the following two equations:
￿x = (I ￿ M1￿x)￿1M2
￿z = (I ￿ M1￿x)￿1 (M1￿z + M3)￿: (27)
Assuming ￿ ￿x and ￿ ￿z exist, the solution for the model￿ s state variables
under RE is:31
xt = ￿ ￿xxt￿1 + ￿
￿1￿ ￿zzt: (28)
Substituting (28) and the expected value of its lead into the second equation
of (22) gives the RE solution for the model￿ s control variables:
yt =
h








￿1￿ ￿z + N3 + N4




31The two solution matrices ￿ ￿x and ￿ ￿z, were obtained applying the method proposed
by Klein (2000).
306.2 Adaptive learning
Under the AL hypothesis, it is also assumed that private agents can correctly
guess the form of the equilibrium policy functions of the state variables given
by (23). However, in contrast to the RE solution, it is assumed that they
do not know the time-invariant parameter values given by ￿ ￿x and ￿ ￿z, which
ultimately govern the dynamics of the economy.32 Therefore, they must rely
on past data and a recursive learning algorithm to estimate these parameters
to produce forecasts of the endogenous state variables for the next period.
As new data become available in each period, they revise their parameter
estimates so that their forecasting errors are corrected gradually.
More formally, agents￿expectations are assumed to follow a so-called
perceived law of motion (PLM) of the form:
E
￿
txt+1= ~ ￿x;t￿1xt + ~ ￿z;t￿1zt (30)
where parameters ~ ￿x and ~ ￿z are the estimates of ￿ ￿x and ￿ ￿z coming from
a recursive least-squares regression and E￿ denotes that expectations do not
follow the RE hypothesis.33
Following a similar procedure as under RE, we substitute (30) into the
￿rst equation of (22) to obtain:
xt= P1xt￿1 + ￿
￿1P2zt (31)
where
P1= (I ￿ M1~ ￿x;t￿1)
￿1M2
P2= (I ￿ M1~ ￿x;t￿1)
￿1
￿




Equation (31) is referred to as the actual law of motion (ALM) since every
new observed value of xt depends on the deep parameters of the model econ-
omy but also on the agents￿forecasts given by the PLM (30).
The actual laws of motion for the control variables under learning are
















32See Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for further details.
33Note, we follow the common assumption (see, e.g. Evans and Honkaphoja, 2001, and
Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou, 2007) that at period t agents form expectations for
xt+1 using their estimates from the previous period, ~ ￿x;t￿1 and ~ ￿z;t￿1, which allows us
to avoid a problem of simultaneity in the learning process.
31To estimate ~ ￿x and ~ ￿z in (30) we ￿rst de￿ne the matrix wt = [Bc;t;
Kc;t; Bs;t; Ks;t; at]0 and then use the recursive least-squares (RLS) learning
algorithm which can be written for t = 1;2;3:::; as follows:
~ ￿t= ~ ￿t￿1+gtR
￿1










where Rt is a matrix with the second moments of the regressors included in
wt; (xt ￿ ~ ￿
0
t￿1wt￿1) is the latest forecast error that will be used to correct
the current estimates; and gt = 1=t is a decreasing gain sequence imply-
ing that, as t increases, every new forecast error will have a lower relative
importance in the updating process.34
6.2.1 Initial conditions for learning
To represent the importance of initial beliefs for the solution of the model
under learning, de￿ne ￿ ￿pre =
￿￿ ￿x;pre; ￿ ￿z;pre
￿0 and ￿ ￿post =
￿￿ ￿x;post; ￿ ￿z;post
￿0
as the RE solution matrices for the pre-reform and post-reform economies,
respectively, and ~ ￿0 =
h
~ ￿x;0; ~ ￿z;0
i0
as the matrix containing the starting
values of the learning algorithm. To obtain the rational expectations solution,
we assume that:
~ ￿0 =
￿￿ ￿x;post; ￿ ￿z;post
￿0 (35)
where R0 is the covariance matrix associated with the values of the en-
dogenous state variables as predicted by their corresponding policy functions
under the post-reform RE solution ￿ ￿post.35
For the case of homogeneous learning, we assume, as in Giannitsarou
(2006) that:
~ ￿0 =
￿￿ ￿x;pre; ￿ ￿z;pre
￿0 (36)
where the covariance matrix R0 is computed as described above, using (36)
instead of (35).
34See, e.g. Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and Honkapohja and Mitra (2006) for details
on stability conditions under learning. We make use of Matlab functions made available
by Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007) to solve the model under AL.
35To obtain R0 we make use of a numerical approximation involving the following steps:
(i) simulate a series of N(0;￿a) random shocks for the exogenous state variable at, for
Tnum = 100;000 periods; (ii) using (i), simulate the values for the endogenous state
variables as predicted by their corresponding policy functions under the post reform RE
solution (￿ ￿post) for Tnum; (iii) construct w(5￿Tnum) including the time series of the simu-
lated values for the ￿ve states (Bc;t; Kc;t; Bs;t; Ks;t; at); and (iv) compute the covariance
matrix in a recursive fashion according to the second equation of (34), where the starting
values R0 and w0 are given by two zero matrices.
32For the case of heterogeneous learning, we assume that the skilled workers
"guess" that the coe¢ cients remain the same and thus use the coe¢ cients
that correspond to the pre-reform economy in their policy functions for the
initial period. In contrast, we assume that the capitalists are able to predict
the post-reform RE steady-state and their optimal reduced form coe¢ cients
for their policy functions in this equilibrium, so that their "guess" for their
initial coe¢ cients correspond to the post-reform RE solution. This hetero-
geneity in beliefs implies that the initial guesses for both agents are e⁄ectively
incorrect, as the actual economy, as determined by the interaction of their
choices, is neither in the pre- nor in the post-reform RE equilibrium. Given
the gap between the expected and actual outcomes, both agents use there-
after recursive least-squares to learn the coe¢ cients.
Formally, let ￿ ￿
c
x;post and ￿ ￿
c
z;post be a (4 ￿ 2) and (1 ￿ 2) sub-matrices of
￿ ￿x;post and ￿ ￿z;post, respectively, containing the two columns of ￿ ￿x;post and
￿ ￿z;post that correspond to the policy functions of the capitalists. Similarly,
let ￿ ￿
s
x;pre and ￿ ￿
s
z;pre be a (4￿2) and (1￿2) sub-matrices of ￿ ￿x;pre and ￿ ￿z;pre,
respectively, containing the two columns of ￿ ￿x;pre and ￿ ￿z;pre that correspond























while, for consistency, R0 is now computed as above but using (37) instead.
Note that for all the post-reform scenarios considered, ~ ￿0 always satis-
￿es the stationarity condition that the real parts of all the eigenvalues of
~ ￿x;0 must lie inside the unit circle, while R0 is always an invertible matrix.
These two conditions ensure the algorithm is adequately initialised, see, e.g.
Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou (2007).






























































































































































Steady-state welfare: Skilled workers
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Steady-state welfare: Unskilled workers
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RE AL pre-reform steady-state
Figure 3: t
k=0.284, B/Y=0.60